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GERMANY
(PRE-WAR)

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PRE-WAR GERMANY = RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION

A. POLICIES

1. The Reichsbahn law of July 4, 1939, was the final definition of the position of the German National Railroad: its internal organization, its financial status, its relationship to the Government and other public bodies and undertakings. Paradoxically, the Reichsbahn must be described as a completely state-owned enterprise which still enjoyed financial, administrative and operating autonomy. As a juristic person, it administered all its operations under its own responsibility. Its peculiar status under the legal device of a "Sondervermögen des Reiches" (Special Property of the Nation) gave it the self-government necessary for successful operation, though "belonging to the Reich alone, influenced by the Reich alone, and responsible to the Reich alone". The only injunction expressly laid on the Reichsbahn was that it was not to consider itself as a profit enterprise but as a public service which had to be self-supporting at the same time.

The transportation policy of the German Governments between the wars transcended the usual duties of regulation of abuses arising from monopolistic tendencies, or the general protection of the public interest. The preamble to the law on land passenger traffic of December 6, 1937, expresses the German attitude in these words:

"In the National Socialist state the leadership (Führung) in regard to transportation is a task of the State. The means of transportation can be operated either by private persons or by public bodies. But all must subject themselves to the rules which are framed uniformly for the whole Reich. Each branch of transportation must be assigned those tasks which it is likely to serve in the best possible manner within the frame of the whole transportation system and of the national economy."

In transportation, as in other phases of economic activity, the Nazi state brought to completion tendencies already existing, for "in Germany the concept of transportation (Verkehrsgedanke) has always been most intimately bound up with the concept of the National State (Reichsgedanke)". The German transport system has been "nothing other than the expression of the political and politico-economic ideas" of Germany.

Paragraph I of the law of February 17, 1934, charged the Reich Minister of Transport with the organization of the whole system of surface transportation on the basis of this conception of uniform control. The way had been prepared for him by the nationalization of the state railroads and the main highways, the inauguration of motor transport regulation, and the assumption by the Hitlerian State of broad powers after the eradication of the states as political entities. More than 90% of the trucks, about 50% of

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the buses, and most of the river vessels were permitted to remain privately-owned and operated. However, the Ministry, by means of the "self-governing" Transport Groups, exercised far-reaching control on the transportation services and auxiliary enterprises not immediately owned by the Government. Hence, the German Ministry of Transport from 1934 to 1939 exercised the functions of a railway board of managers for the Reichsbahn, combined with responsibilities similar to those of the US Interstate Commerce Commission and of the US Maritime Commission as regards the remaining carriers.

In pre-war years such as 1937, the Reichsbahn handled about 73% of all freight traffic of the country, as against 3% handled by privately-owned railway lines, 21 1/2% by waterway carriers and 2 1/2% by highway vehicles. In the passenger field, statistical evidence is less complete, but the Reichsbahn apparently conducted some 70% of all passenger travel, privately-owned railways about 3%, and the motor carriers about 27%, much of which was purely local business. In physical extent, the inland waterways (streams and canals) totaled 12,000 kilometers, the railroad net 80,000 kilometers, and the road net (including the Autobahnen) 250,000 kilometers.

The following indicates generally the proportions of the pre-war division of traffic:

Type of Transportation	Freight Tons	Passengers
Private railways	3,700,000,000	22,200,000
State railways (the Reichsbahn)	97,832,600,000	618,204,100
Waterways	28,972,600,000	-----
Highways	3,254,000,000	214,000,000
Total	133,759,200,000	881,404,100

2. The law of February 17, 1934, combined in the National Transport Ministry the governmental regulation of all modes of surface transportation with the management of the national railroads. The glaring exception to the "uniformity of control" prescribed by this law was the independent administrative position of Dr. Fritz Todt, succeeded by Alfred Speer, as General Inspector of the German Road System.

Although the posts of Minister of Transport and General Manager of the Reichsbahn were combined in one person after 1937, the Transport Ministry, through its railroad departments, administered the railroads on a basis of extreme decentralization.

3. The Germans were among the first to recognize that the "armed forces of a nation are not a thing in themselves, but an expression of the entire state and folk structure. A real people in arms must utilize for the purposes of national

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defense everything that the land and its characteristics provide... An industrialized state must possess armed forces that use all the possibilities of industry". This concept is that which General Thomas, Chief of the Military-Economics Section of the German General Staff, called "depth of armament", and which is usually described in Ludendorff's phrase as "total war". "A certain military political meaning can be demonstrated for every branch of politics". The place of transportation in this scheme of grand strategy is subordinated to the general needs of the economy. "The principle is that transportation does not exist for itself, but has its only meaning and justification in serving the country's economy". The Mittelland canal, for example, was conceived in terms of the huge Hermann Goering works at Salzgitter.

The roles assigned to transport in theoretical considerations of strategy were therefore secondary to its economic importance in the war potential. At the same time, German transportation was in a state of all but complete mobilization even before the outbreak of war. Most obviously, pre-war physical transportation facilities far exceeded the demands of a normal peace time industry. That the restrictions on highway and inland waterway traffic were kept in force until 1938 demonstrates that neither the Autobahnen nor the canals fulfilled essential needs. "If from many sides critical opinions are heard which proclaim our overcapacity, it still remains an enduring principle that a responsible government plans and creates all traffic means and establishments in terms of the future. In transportation, potential must be greater than immediate transport needs. The best example is the building of the Autobahnen ordered by the Fuhrer."

The strategic meaning of the Reichsbahn in Nazi thinking is illustrated by a significant change in the wording of the fundamental laws. Paragraph 2 of the laws of August 30, 1924, and March 13, 1930, agreed that the Reichsbahn was "to conduct its operations for the preservation of the German folk economy under business principles." In section 3, paragraph 3, the law of July 4, 1939, provided that the "Reichsbahn is to be administered for the use of the German people; in this connection, the importance of the national defense is to be considered".

4. After November 1923, the German Reichsbahn received no financial subsidy from the Reich. On the contrary, from 1924 to 1931 the railroad paid sums approximating 660 million RM annually for reparations under the Dawes plan, and at the same time a transportation tax averaging 290 million RM annually. After the end of reparations, a fixed sum of 70 million RM was paid annually in addition to the transport tax. With the expansion of German industry under the Nazis, the Reichsbahn was called on to contribute even more substantially to the Government. In 1937, a plan was worked out whereby 3% of a total under 4 billion RM, and 9% of any sum over 4 billion RM, were to be turned over to the Government. The amounts for 1937 and 1938 were 157.8 million RM

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and 193.4 million RM respectively. In addition to these sums the Reichsbahn paid the transport tax, which for 1937 was 254.7 million RM and for 1938, 286.7 million RM. The law of July 4, 1939, on the assumption that with the absorption of the Austrian, Sudeten, and Memel lines a total operating income of 4.6 billion RM might be expected, provided that 3% of this amount--and in no case less than 100 million RM annually should be paid to the Nation. This was to be treated as operating expense. In addition, it was provided that the contribution should be increased or decreased by 10% of the amount of which the total income exceeded or fell below the stated level of 4.6 billion RM.

5. The use of the "Gemeinnutzliches Tarifsysteem" as an instrument to effect Nazi economic ideas is described in C-2.

The subordination of the states to the nation was an avowed goal of the post-Bismarckian German Nation. As part of this policy, the Weimar constitution assumed for the Reich control of all means of transportation, but practice lagged behind the expression of intention. The states fought the Reichsbank on the allotment of railroad stops and stations, and the geographical definitions of administrative boundaries. Seven thousand local political units were involved in the administration of the roads. The transfer of waterways to the Reich set for April 1, 1921, was never effected, because the states wished to give up only the duty of maintenance, while reserving to themselves the right of administering flood control, drainage, reclamation and water transportation. The law of February 17, 1934, with exceptions already noted, accomplished the transport unification of Germany, to go along with the political unification proclaimed by Hitler on January 30, 1933.

In the field of what the Germans called "Bevölkerungspolitik" (population politics) important missions were assigned the railroad and the Autobahnen. "The state has built a series of railroads which, by private economic standards, were never worth building, because they brought in no profit. Thinly settled, economically poor districts have been tied up with industrial and cultural developments. The economy of border districts, where the populace, because of the proximity of the foreigner, needed particular strengthening, has been supported." The decentralization of industry was stated as an official government policy as early as March 29, 1935.

Transportation was also an agent of politics in the narrowest sense of that word. The canals, the Autobahnen, the commercial air fleet were all visible symbols of the vitality of the new regime, as well as sources of employment for the workless. "At all times the roads have been the expression of the culture and status of a people. The highways of ancient Rome, of Napoleon and the Chinese Empire, and of the Incas bear witness to this fact. Our roads also shall exist eternally--The name Adolf Hitler obliges us to make of his roads the expression of our new era."

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The German conception of the place of that country in the world geographic structure has been popularized in the geo-political writings of Karl Haushofer. The traffic-geographical conditions of Germany can be summarized as: (a) the almost parallel south to north course of comparatively closely situated rivers (Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, Vistula) which needed only the east-west connections supplied by the Mittelland and Adolf Hitler canals; (b) the influence of river valleys by the shaping of the mountain ranges in the development of the railways; (c) the full opportunities provided the automobile by the extensive lowlands that make up the greater part of Germany.

The perennial aspirations of the nationalistic intelligentsia of Germany, Middle Europe under German domination, and the "Drang nach Osten" were undoubtedly conscious aims of the German transportation policy. An example in point is the waterways. "The primo consideration has been not whether the way would be a sound economic development, not whether tolls received plus income from power plants would carry the fixed charges incurred for construction, but whether the completed waterway would serve as an artery in a completely united and self-sufficient economic area, composed of Germany and the small states on the Danube, under the domination of Germany, and affording basic economic security and military power."

B. ORGANIZATION

1. The Ministry of Transport was concerned only with major problems of policy, such as rates, status of personnel, and budgetary matters. Routine control and day-to-day management
2. were effected by the 26 (in 1938) Divisional Managements (Reichsbahndirektionen), who were not limited in authority to the maintenance of way and structure and the operation of equipment, as in the American scheme of divisional organization. On certain matters of policy the Minister had the advice of a special advisory council, formed of representatives of industry, trade, and public. Directly under him there
3. were two technical offices, at Berlin and Munich, in charge of mechanical and civil engineering, workshops, research, and other technical matters requiring common administration.

Under the divisions were the local district offices for traffic, construction, operations, locomotives and rolling stock, responsible for their particular function in their districts. The major workshops were supervised by a board consisting of ten of the division managers. To coordinate the work of the 26 divisional managements there were three operating offices, in Berlin (East), Essen (West), and Munich (South). They were responsible for the harmonious coordination of train and traffic working in the divisions under their immediate control. However, the divisions were on equal footing with the operating offices, and in all administrative matters were responsible only to Berlin.

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The general regulation of private railroads was also the task of the divisional president, although tariff problems were still reserved to the Minister. In the case of light railroads, the regulatory functions were divided. Powers of administrative regulation were delegated to the state authorities, whereas technical regulation was exercised in all areas (except Bavaria) by the presidents of the division managements. Both private and light railways were members of the Reich Railways Transport Group in the National Transport Group of the German corporative system. The Railway Transport Group therefore represented the railroads insofar as they remained in private, municipal or state hands, but only in a consultative sense.

The centralization of power in the Reichsverkehrsministerium (Ministry of Transport begun by the decree of June 21, 1919, and confirmed by the law of February 17, 1934, continued all through the pre-war period. It is to be noted that two aspects of transportation were assigned to other agencies: (a) air transportation was the business of the General Air Office in the National Air Ministry, (b) the supervision of road construction and maintenance had been shifted to the Inspector General for Roads.

The Ministry of Transport was headed by a Minister, Dr. Ing. e. h. Dröpmüller. The Undersecretary, Dr. Ing. Ganzenmüller, was the overall head of the Railroad Divisions. An Advisory Council (Beirat) consisting mainly of industry representatives and transportation experts, carried out purely consultative functions. The various divisions of the Ministry will be discussed below as they were related to each form of transport.

The railroad divisions of the Reichsverkehrsministerium did not merely "supervise" or "control" the administration of the Reich railroads; they managed them directly. All organs of the Reichsbahn were Reich agencies, its employees were civil servants of the Reich. The Minister of Transport was the head of the Reichsbahn, with the title of Generaldirektor der Deutschen Reichsbahn. As Assistant in this capacity, he had an Undersecretary of the Ministry, whose title was Stellvertretender Generaldirektor (Deputy General Manager).

The Railway Traffic and Rates Division (Eisenbahn-Verkehrs- und Tarifabteilung) prepared and adjusted rate schedules, organized the regular transportation services for passengers and shippers, and in addition handled large mass movements of persons and goods and arranged preferential rate schedules therefor. In this capacity, it managed the transport aspects of the Nuernberg mass meeting of "Kraft durch Freude"; and in wartime it adapted railroad transport regulations to military needs, in cooperation with the Railroad Finances and Legal Matters Division.

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The Operational Management Division (Eisenbahnbetriebsabteilung) controlled the operational coordination of the whole railroad system, including the technique of train and locomotive services, marshalling and switching, and the preparation of timetables.

The Machine-technical Matters and Purchasing Division (Eisenbahn-Maschinentechnische-und-Einkaufsabteilung) placed orders for major new acquisitions, and was the top administrative agency in control of workshops, stores, locomotives and electrification works. It handled mechanization projects, electrification, and research on the problem of substituting domestic materials for imported ones in order to save foreign exchange.

The Railroad Finances and Legal Matters Division (Eisenbahn-Finanz-und Rechtsabteilung) handled the finances of the Reichsbahn, one of the world's largest single business enterprises, separately from the general finances of the Reich. The accounts of the Reichsbahn were prepared from the daily reports of the 26 Divisional Managements, which were treated almost as separate enterprises. As prescribed by the Reichsbahngesetz, balance sheets and profit-and-loss accounts had to be published yearly. This Division had two sections. The Legal Section (Rechtsabteilung) handled the Reichsbahn's day-to-day legal business, formulated rail legislation and transport regulations. The Light Railroad Section (Kleinabteilung) regulated the 136 privately-owned railroads, the 309 narrow-gauge railroads, and the 100 commercially run sidings, all totaling about 13,000 kilometers, which formed approximately 20% of the Reichsbahn's entire network. Routine technical matters for these roads were controlled by division managements. The private and light railroads were organized into a corporate system of transportation, which as a unit exercised strict control over its members and interfered radically with the management of the component enterprises. This corporate system was under the control of The Division for General Administration (Abteilung für Verwaltung).

The Division of Personnel Matters (Eisenbahn-Personalabteilung) handled the personnel affairs of more than 1,000,000 men and women. One section (under a Ministerialdirektor) dealt with employees; another (under a Ministerialrat) with laborers.

The Division of Construction (Eisenbahn-Bauabteilung) supervised the reconstruction and expansion program. In addition, numerous Construction Offices (Neubauämter) were created; these were subordinated to the Divisional Managements.

The Railway Planning Division (Eisenbahn Planungsabteilung), a newcomer among the railroad divisions, seems to have assumed, before 1943, the functions of the former Railroad

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Construction Division (Eisenbahn-Bauabteilung). Although no complete description of the work of this division is available, it may be assumed that the jurisdictional difference between it and the Division of Construction was that the Planning Division prepared the plans for new construction and reconstruction projects, the execution of which was supervised by the Division of Construction.

The Railway Military Matters Group (Eisenbahnwehrmachtliche Angelegenheiten), set up long before the war as a liaison between the Ministry of Transport and the Wehrmacht, prepared the plans to meet the needs of military transportation and arranged schedules to go into effect when war should begin. During the war, this division cooperated closely with the military authorities.

The Audit Organization of the Reichsbahn (Hauptprüfungsamt) audited the Reichsbahn accounts. It cleared accounts with the Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reiches (Court of Accounts of the Reich). Subordinated to the above were the audit offices attached to the Central Offices and to each Division Management. The chiefs of these were the accounting officers of the respective agencies. When they acted in the capacity of chief of audit offices, they reported to the Chief Audit Office; otherwise, they reported to the President of their agency.

Complementing the Transport Ministry in its performance of regulatory functions were two organizations, a resume of whose workings will be given here.

By the Act of November 27, 1934, Germany's business enterprises were organized into self-governing groups, headed by the Reich Economic Chambers, with compulsory membership. The 140,000 transportation enterprises were originally a part of this system, but by a decree of September 23, 1936, they were separated from the other Reich groups, renamed "Organization of Transport", and divided into seven functional groups.

The Transport Groups were placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Transport, whereas the other Reich Groups remained under the nominal administration of the Ministry of Economics. The Transport Groups, although referred to as "self-governing bodies", acted as government agencies, with power to intervene in almost every aspect of the management of the transportation enterprises, including questions of expansion, transfer of officers, and personnel problems. Through interchange of delegates with the other organizations, such as the Reich Chamber of Economy, the functional and regional groupings of industry and trade, and the German Labor Front, uniformity of administration was theoretically ensured.

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Those transportation facilities which were not in the hands of the Reich were thus united into the Reich Transportation Industry (Reichsverkehrsgewerbe) with these seven groups:

1. Ocean Transport
2. Motor Transportation
3. Private Railways
4. Inland Shipping
5. Forwarding and Storage
6. Auxiliaries of Transport
7. Hauling and Carting

These groups were divided into Trade Groups (Fachgruppen), which in their turn were divided into Sub-Trade Groups (Fachuntergruppen).

The function of the National Transportation Advisory Council was to produce a close liaison between different branches of the industry and in turn with the users of transportation. The results of their deliberations were presented to the Transport Minister to use or reject as he saw fit. The Council meetings were held irregularly at the convenience of the Minister, who also fixed the agenda for the meeting. The broad purpose was an exchange of ideas on the national scale between shipper and carrier. The composition of the council indicates the character of its representation: The leaders of the 7 transport groups, 6 delegates from industry, 2 from the National Food Chamber, and 1 each from the Air Ministry, the Post Office, and the Inspector General of Roads, the Cities, the German Labor Service, and the National Cultural Chamber. The Advisory Council was duplicated all down the echelons of command so that every subgroup had an advisory council formed on the same representative principle.

4. As has been said, prior to the Weimar Republic, transportation matters were not centralized in the Reich. The Weimar Constitution, however, transferred the state railroads to the Reich for uniform management. By the decree of June 21, 1919, the Reich Ministry of Transport was established. In 1934, the Reich Ministry of Transport and the Prussian Ministry of Transport were unified under the name of the Reichs-und Preussisches Verkehrsministerium. After the annexation of Austria, the name again became Reichsverkehrsministerium.

When the Ministry of Transport was created, the aim was to concentrate all supervision and control in one Reich agency. The states showed considerable resistance, which was gradually overcome to some extent. Under the Nazi regime, the internal

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organization and personnel of the Ministry of Transport were at first left relatively unchanged. The concentration of power in the Ministry of Transport continued, although important sectors were again taken out of its jurisdiction: (a) the Ministry of Air Transport took over aerial transportation; (b) the construction of waterways was transferred to the Inspector General for Water and Power; (c) the supervision of road construction and maintenance was transferred to the Inspector General for Roads; and (d) maritime shipping was placed under the Reich Commissioner for Ocean Shipping in 1941.

5. In the absence of a free press or of parliamentary debate on the Anglo-American model, there could be no free expression of opinion in Germany on the operating efficiency of a government department or a state monopoly. Taking performance as the yardstick of measurement, we have the statement of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

"In brief, the Reichsbahn was the sort of plant any railway man would like to have constructed had he been free from financial obligations...Esprit de corps among German railroaders appears to have been very good. Moreover, the standard of technical training and general competence was exceptionally good."

"Prior to the war, Germany possessed one of the most complex, adequate and well-maintained railroad systems in the world...A strong inland waterway system connecting the important rivers of North Germany, crisscrossing the Ruhr coal area, and providing through water transportation from the Ruhr into the Berlin area, accounted for 21 to 36 percent of the total freight traffic movement. It was well adapted to the movement of heavy cargoes in and out of the Ruhr district. Commercial highway transportation of freight was of little significance, accounting for less than three percent of the total, and coastwise shipping was of minor importance compared with the total inland movement. Contrary to general belief at the outbreak of the war, none of these transportation systems was undermaintained. Standards were well above those common in the United States, an element of strength which would permit curtailment in maintenance for a period of years before operating efficiency or safety would be affected."

C. ADMINISTRATION

1. This question is not strictly applicable, since the governmental policy was one of restricting rather than expanding transport facilities and enterprises. For specific information, see the relevant sections of this report.

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2. The German rate structure was known as Gemeinwirtschaftliches Tarifsystern (rate structure based on the interests of the economic life of the country as a whole). The subordination of the freight rate structure to considerations of economy, defense and politics may be illustrated by noting some of the special adjustments. The railroad rates effective in 1937 reflected the four-year plan. Thus special rates were established for raw materials used in the manufacture of artificial wool and cotton yarns. Special rates were also allowed for German raw materials where such rates stimulated their use and saved foreign exchange; examples were ores, slags, and synthetic Diesel fuel. Low rates on potash and calcium were designed to help agriculture. On the other hand, by way of aiding exports, iron and steel goods, paper, glass supplies, and chemicals could be hauled to seaports at special rates. Material for the Autobahnen was carried at cost, this accommodation (rendered for an ostensible subsidiary which was in reality a rival) amounting to a probable total sacrifice of 100 million RM at the end of 1937. In addition, some arrangements were even more directly political. Building materials for the party grounds at Nuremberg were forwarded at a reduced rate of 30 percent. In addition, goods destined for winter help were shipped free of charge, entailing a freight revenue loss to the Reichsbahn of 18 million RM.

The Reichsbahn had separate rating systems in operation for wagon-load traffic and traffic in part wagon-loads, and further, according to whether the traffic was conveyed in ordinary freight trains. The ordinary rate classification applied only to wagon-load traffic; there was no classification for part wagon-load traffic, which was charged according to freight tables based on weight and distance. Wagon-load rates applied to wagon loads of 15 tons and upwards, and were increased by fixed percentages, varying with the class of goods for wagon-loads of ten tons and five tons respectively. All haulage rates tapered downwards with increase in distance.

The exceptional tariffs were not always special rates as usually understood, that is, rates applying to certain goods and to certain areas. There was a considerable number of exceptional tariffs in favor of certain commodities from all stations to all stations in Germany. Some of these so-called special rates had a general application and thus functioned merely as a new classification added to the general tariff. Thus, there was a raw materials tariff for bulk commodities such as fertilizers, potatoes, minerals, etc. These general exceptional rates had no quantity restrictions and were available to and from all stations in Germany.

In addition, there were many genuine exceptional tariffs. These rates were subjected to a number of restrictions over and above those which would apply to the same commodity when dispatched at the normal rate. The employment by a

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trader of a given special exceptional tariff was usually dependent upon the observation by him of certain attendant clauses. An example was the 'producer' clause; when this was imposed the goods for dispatch must have come from a particular country, district or town. This clause was generally imposed as a discrimination between home products and imported goods, but was also employed to aid the development of an industry in an area unfavorably situated geographically. When the clause 'prohibiting re-export' was applied, goods were given a reduced rate to a particular foreign country on the understanding that once the goods had reached their destination, they would not be re-consigned elsewhere.

Exceptional tariffs were introduced on the German railways as part of a policy which aimed at adjusting the cost of transport so as to benefit the country as a whole by assisting industry and trade against foreign competition, and by developing exports. The exceptional tariffs may be divided into two main categories: (a) Exceptional assistance tariffs; these were introduced in order to favor economic activities within Germany. They facilitated the transport of vital goods, the movements of exports from their place of origin to the seaport, and protection of home markets. They overcame temporary disadvantages by emergency measures, e.g. they permitted the granting of rebates to retain the custom of traders near a frontier, who could obtain cheaper rates by using a foreign railway. (b) Exceptional competitive tariffs: these tariffs were designed to prevent any undue trespassing within Germany of foreign transport systems which could offer lower rates for exports and imports - seaports, railways, waterways, air or road transport. A prominent example of such tariffs was the Seehafenausnahmetarife, which exerted a powerful influence in diverting to Bremen and Hamburg from Antwerp and Rotterdam the traffic of Western Germany, and which to some extent diverted from Antwerp, Rotterdam, Marseilles, Genoa and Trieste the traffic of South Germany and Switzerland.

3. Since the fixing of tariff rates is the single most important instrument of regulating transport competition, this question is implicitly answered in the answers to question C-2.
4. There were no peculiarities in the German administrative system of safety regulation and inspection which require enumeration here. The only difference from commonly accepted practices lay in the high degree of centralization within the Ministry of Transport.
5. The employees of the Reichsbahn, by far the largest single element in transportation, were civil servants, and therefore subjected to the training and educational requirements of civil service. They were similarly divided into three main classes: higher civil servants (höhere Beamte), civil servants of intermediate rank (mittlere Beamte), and those of lower rank (untere Beamte). Prior to the war higher officials numbered about 1.2%, civil servants of intermediate rank 30%, and those of lower rank 68.8% of railroad personnel.

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The higher career was in general open only to well recommended applicants with full university education and good scholastic records. Applicants with legal background were required to have passed the state bar examination which required, in addition to graduation from a university, 3 to 4 years of training in courts and law offices. Applicants with engineering background were required to have graduated from an institute of technology in mechanical or civil engineering, and, after 3 years training in technical railroad service or in other technical enterprises, to have passed a special engineering examination for higher railroad service. Then admitted to railroad service, both classes were trained for a period of 1 1/2 to 2 years in all fields of practical routine (in division managements, superintendents' offices, and subordinate agencies). They then started as junior section members of a division management. Promotions were based on ability. Under pre-war conditions about 45% of higher officials were civil engineers, 25% mechanical engineers, and 20% had legal training. Only about 10% were promoted from the intermediate ranks.

The intermediate career was open to boys who had completed 4 years of grammar school and 6 years of high school. Many applicants, however, had a better education, and for admission to technical services graduates from technical high schools were preferred. Positions as chiefs and assistants in the agencies subordinate to the division managements and all important clerical jobs in agencies of all grades were filled with civil servants of intermediate rank.

Civil servants of lower rank were usually recruited from workmen employed in railroad service or from former non-commissioned army officers who -- after a certain period of service -- had obtained a certificate for preferential admission to civil service (Zivilversorgungsschein). Such positions as stationmaster at small stations, clerical helper, locomotive engineer, fireman, conductor, and foreman in maintenance of way and structure and equipment service, were occupied by servants of lower rank.

The status of workmen was similar to that which prevailed in German industry in general. The largest groups of workmen were helpers in services usually performed by civil servants (Hilfskräfte in Beamtendienst), workers in train and switching service (Betriebsarbeiter), track laborers (Bahnarbeiter), and shop laborers (Werkstattarbeiter). A small number of employees, such as typists and clerks (mostly women), had the status of clerical workers (Angestellte). Their status was determined by the general provisions which German legislation had established for clerical workers.

6. As of September 1, 1938, Germany had ratified these international transport conventions of the League of Nations: the transit conventions, ports convention, railways convention, the declaration recognizing the flag of Inland States, the hydro-electric power convention, the road and motor traffic conventions. Germany

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belonged to the following international organizations concerned with transportations

The Baltic and International Association of Navigation
Congresses
International Shipping Conference
International Shipping Federation
Union for the Use of Carriages and Vans in International
Traffic
International Railway Congress Association
Central Office for International Railway Transport
International Railway Union
International Railway Wagon Union
International Conference for Promoting Technical Uniformity
on Railways
European Conference on Time-Tables.

In addition, Germany was a member of the Verein Mitteleuropaischer Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Association of Central European Railway Administrations). The last organization, since voting representation was based on mileage and its decisions were binding on all memberships, was of fundamental importance.